The modern American right has an enemy and no unified remedy. It can tell you at length what it is against. Ask what it is building, and the room gets quiet.
This is the first of nine chapters trying to put something in that space, and at least start a conversation about what should and must unite us. The title of this thing is a theft from Swift, who wrote A Modest Proposal deadpan because he believed no decent answer was on offer and wanted you to feel the absence. I believe there is an answer, and that is what we’ll discuss in this series.
The diagnosis begins here, because what I’m proposing has been attempted before, and the attempt is an instructive failure from American political history.
Everybody on the American right has an opinion about fusionism right now, and most of them have it backwards. We’ve talked about it in previous shows, even. The received version goes like this: in the 1950s a man named Frank Meyer worked out a philosophy joining libertarians to traditionalists, it was called fusionism, it governed American conservatism for fifty years, and it has now broken down.
That’s four claims, and three of them are wrong.
Meyer didn’t call it fusionism; his chief opponent appears to have coined the word as an insult, and when Meyer replied he refused the framing in print. It wasn’t worked out in the 1950s; the theory arrived in 1962, seven years after the coalition had already been assembled, staffed and put on a masthead. And it never governed anything, because it was attacked from both flanks inside two years and never won the remedy argument.
The one true claim is that it has broken down. It has broken down several times, which is the interesting part, and the reason it breaks isn’t the reason people think.
Two worlds
Before 1955, there were two intellectual worlds here that we now file under one word, and they weren’t in conversation.
Start with the libertarians, except nobody called them that yet. Albert Jay Nock published Our Enemy, the State in 1935 and, the following year, an essay in the Atlantic Monthly called “Isaiah’s Job” that is the purest statement of that world’s self-understanding. Stop trying to reach the masses, Nock argued. Take care instead of what he called the Remnant, who are “obscure, unorganized, inarticulate, each one rubbing along as best he can.”
Nock’s program is custodial by design, explicitly not a mass movement. Twenty years later, the same tradition would be in the business of winning elections.
What made a mass audience possible was a magazine. Hayek published The Road to Serfdom in Britain in March 1944 and in America that September, after Macmillan, Little Brown and Harper had all turned it down; Chicago printed two thousand copies. Then in April 1945 Reader’s Digest ran a condensation. The Digest’s circulation was about 8,750,000. The condensation was reprinted and distributed through the Book-of-the-Month Club at five cents a copy, and more than a million of those went out. The University of Chicago Press estimates its edition of the actual book has sold something over 350,000 copies in the eighty years since.
Put those side by side. The Road to Serfdom reached America as a nickel pamphlet in a magazine your grandmother subscribed to, not as a university press monograph, and it arrived paraphrased.
That audience got institutions, barely. Ludwig von Mises, the most important living theorist of the Austrian school, held a visiting professorship at NYU from 1945 to 1969 that the university didn’t pay for. The William Volker Fund and a businessman who sat on NYU’s board funded his support. The academy tolerated him without employing him.
The other world arrives late and fast. Richard Weaver published Ideas Have Consequences in 1948, dating the decline of the West to the victory of nominalism in the late Scholastic period. Russell Kirk published The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana in May 1953.
Kirk’s book did one thing nothing else had done: it supplied the word. Time gave its entire book section to it on 6 July 1953, and Regnery said afterward that the book gave an amorphous, scattered opposition an identity. Look at what people called themselves before that. Nock called himself a radical individualist, not a libertarian. Buckley called himself an individualist until 1955, not a conservative. Goldwater was describing himself as a progressive in 1952 and put The Conscience of a Conservative on a cover in 1960.
Kirk supplied the noun and a two-century ancestry to go with it. What he didn’t supply was any agreement about what the noun meant, which is something we still debate today.
The fusion was a hiring decision
The nineteenth of November, 1955. Volume one, number one.
Notice the names on the masthead of the National Review.
Editor and publisher: William F. Buckley Jr. Editors: James Burnham, Willmoore Kendall, Suzanne La Follette, Jonathan Mitchell, William S. Schlamm. Then a box headed Associates and Contributors with sixteen names, including Brent Bozell, John Chamberlain, Frank Chodorov, Max Eastman, Karl Hess, Russell Kirk, Eugene Lyons, Frank S. Meyer, Freda Utley and Richard Weaver.
Kirk and Weaver are in that box. The authors of the two foundational traditionalist books, filed alongside Frank Chodorov, the purest surviving anti-interventionist in America, who had been thrown out of the Henry George School in 1942 for opposing the war, and alongside Max Eastman, who translated Trotsky into English. Three men on that list had carried a Communist Party card and broken with it, and a fourth had been a personal friend of Trotsky himself.
That is the fusion. Not an argument. Not principles. A list of magazine employees.
Where did Buckley get these people is a critical part of the thesis.
There was a libertarian magazine called The Freeman, revived in 1950, which had an editorial civil war in early 1953 over its posture toward Eisenhower’s nomination. Three editors walked out: John Chamberlain, Forrest Davis and Suzanne La Follette. Frank Meyer resigned in solidarity.
Buckley considered buying the magazine. He didn’t. Instead, he hired the losing faction. La Follette became National Review’s managing editor; Chamberlain, Davis and Meyer are on the masthead above. He also took the magazine’s headline typeface, its books and arts sections, and a staffer named Gertrude Vogt.
So the physical act of fusion was a personnel transfer out of somebody else’s failed magazine, into a room that also held Catholic traditionalists and ex-Trotskyists.
And here is how it could be imposed instead of negotiated. Buckley’s father put in the first hundred thousand dollars. The venture sought something on the order of half a million; the sources conflict, so I can’t give you a figure for what was actually raised, because nobody really knows, but raising half a million back then was no small thing. What is documented specifically is the structure: Class A stock sold to outside investors with no votes, Class B held entirely by Buckley, carrying all of them. Donors held 49 percent of the shares. Buckley held 51 percent of the votes. He was explicit about why, saying there are a number of difficulties you don’t have if you own all the stock.
He and Schlamm had just watched The Freeman destroy itself. They built a company that couldn’t be captured. The magazine was a proprietorship that employed a coalition, never a coalition of equals.
Which brings me to the Publisher’s Statement in that issue, and the most quoted sentence in American conservatism.
Here it is in full:
“It stands athwart history, yelling Stop, at a time when no one is inclined to do so, or to have much patience with those who so urge it.”
Buckley is describing National Review. The familiar version, that a conservative is someone who stands athwart history yelling stop, is a later mutation of the idea; he was describing a weekly, not defining a philosophy. It was the first mission statement of the new conservative infrastructure.
The statement also carries a boxed set of convictions. Here is the end of the first:
“In this great social conflict of the era, we are, without reservations, on the libertarian side.”
And the end of the second:
“On this point we are, without reservations, on the conservative side.”
Consecutive paragraphs. Identical construction. Two different nouns. And no connecting argument, not one sentence about why those two allegiances belong to the same person. The word fusion doesn’t appear in that document. Neither does synthesis. Neither does virtue. The word order appears once, as an adjective, in a passing insult aimed at Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Somebody will say two of the later convictions gesture at a synthesis, and they do: one defends the price system as indispensable to liberty and material progress, and another ties freedom to decentralization. Those are gestures, but they aren’t an account of why liberty requires virtue.
And Frank Meyer, who would write that account, isn’t among the editors. He’s in the Associates box, between Eugene Lyons and Gerhart Niemeyer.
The theory, seven years late(r)
Meyer joined the Communist Party of Great Britain at Balliol in 1931, went to the London School of Economics, was elected president of the student union as an open communist, and was expelled and deported. Back in America he became a Party functionary, training cadre rather than organizing in the street. He spent fourteen years inside, and he stayed through the Moscow purge trials and the Hitler-Stalin pact. The story everybody tells is that he read The Road to Serfdom in the Army and flipped. Meyer said something like that, so it isn’t invented, but John Judis, who interviewed his old comrades, doesn’t think a book accounts for the speed of it.
Here’s his theory, stated as I believe Meyer would want it stated: there are two realms and freedom means different things in each. In the moral realm, the end of human life is virtue, defined by an objective transcendent order man doesn’t invent, and freedom there is instrumental. In the political realm, freedom is the end, and not because virtue has been demoted. The political order’s whole competence is the use of force, and force can’t produce virtue. An act performed under compulsion is the outward shape of a virtuous act and not the thing itself. So a state that sets out to make men good destroys the only condition under which they could become good.
His lines are tight. These are from In Defense of Freedom (Regnery, 1962), as quoted by the scholar Jonathan Adler, not read off Meyer’s page:
“Unless he can choose his worst, he cannot choose his best.”
“good and truth cannot be enforced, because by their essential nature they cannot be made real in men unless they are freely chosen.”
That isn’t indifference to virtue. The state has three legitimate functions on his account and no more: police, military, the administration of justice. Everything that actually forms a person happens in the church, the family, the school, the voluntary association, which are exactly the institutions a growing state displaces.
The public formula arrived in a column in the middle of January 1962, and the column is the title of this chapter.
“That fused position recognizes at one and the same time the transcendent goal of human existence...”
and it continues to the primacy of the freedom of the person in the political order.
But go read what that column is actually doing, because it works as a boundary-policing column long before it works as theory. Meyer’s target is a sector he calls pure libertarians, whose offense is that they
“sharply repudiate the struggle against the major and most immediate contemporary enemy of freedom, Soviet Communism.”
He names the opposite error too, a state unlimitedly instituted to enforce virtue. But the occasion is the Cold War, not philosophy. One account, John Payne’s, holds that the column attacked Murray Rothbard and his followers without naming them, and that this made Rothbard’s exile from mainstream conservatism permanent.
So the chronology is tighter than the textbooks have it. The same two thousand words that gave the coalition its formula also threw people out of it. Theory and enforcement, same column, January 1962.
Attacked from both flanks
The theory lasted about eight months before the best attack on it arrived, from inside the building.
On 11 September 1962 National Review published “Freedom or Virtue?” by Brent Bozell, who was Buckley’s Yale classmate, brother-in-law and co-author.
Bozell concedes Meyer’s premise entirely and then denies that anything follows. Yes, virtue must be freely chosen. But the freedom moral choice requires is interior, the freedom of the will, and the state can’t touch it:
“the freedom that is necessary to virtue is presumably a freedom no man will ever be without.”
“The Soviet citizen is every bit as ‘free’ to earn salvation as his American counterpart”
That’s a fair point. If the freedom virtue requires is the freedom of the will, Meyer built a political philosophy around protecting something politics was never able to reach.
So what is politics for? To build a commonwealth whose laws and customs make virtue easier. And notice how modest Bozell actually is: such inducements, he writes, “can never be entirely, or even very, successful,” but they “can ease the way to virtue.” Since men incline toward evil, removing those supports is abandonment and not neutrality, and whether a particular use of state power helps is a question of prudence judged case by case.
His closing sentence, with the capital F that is in the printed text:
“The story of how the Free society has come to take priority over the good society is the story of the decline of the West.”
To be clear, Bozell explicitly disclaimed theocracy in that essay, and Meyer accused him of it anyway. And there’s a coda that tells you how much of a treaty this was. Bozell left National Review in 1963 and over the next decade moved toward a Catholic integralism that rejected the American political order itself. The man who won the technical philosophical argument in 1962 responded to winning it by leaving the movement.
From the other flank, earlier and in some ways worse, came the man who had built the American audience in the first place. In 1960, two years before Meyer’s book, Hayek attached to The Constitution of Liberty a postscript titled “Why I Am Not a Conservative.”
His charge isn’t that conservatives are bad people. It’s that conservatism is a temperament, and a temperament can’t govern:
“by its very nature it cannot offer an alternative to the direction in which we are moving.”
It can slow the rate. It can’t change the heading. Then the harder one:
“the conservative does not object to coercion or arbitrary power so long as it is used”
for ends he considers right, which is why conservatives in office so reliably use the instruments they denounced in opposition. And this, which is worth holding through everything that follows:
“It is this nationalistic bias which frequently provides the bridge from conservatism to collectivism.”
This is precisely the turn we’re seeing in American conservatism right now, diagnosed by Hayek in 1960. Because conservatism is a mood, a temperament, then it won’t have specific principled goals outside of slowing progress. So at some point, conservative politicians will become what they hate, administrators doling out central planning to their constituents to maintain relevance and get reelected.
What you can say precisely is that the most authoritative libertarian of the century published a formal refusal to be called a conservative, two years before the coalition’s theorist published his credo, for reasons that cut at the conservative side of the merger exactly where Bozell was about to defend it.
And then Meyer put it in his own book. In 1964, he edited an anthology called What Is Conservatism?, which is the coalition as a physical artifact. Hayek’s “Why I Am Not a Conservative” is reprinted inside it, under a section heading that reads “Emphasis on Freedom.” The closing chapter is titled “Consensus and Divergence.”
They shelved the refusal in their own cathedral and labeled it an emphasis.
The test it kept failing
So if the philosophy was contested from both directions within two years, what held this coalition together for thirty?
The standard answer is anti-communism, and George Nash, whose history is the standard one, writes that fusionism as an attempt at theoretical harmony was immensely assisted by the cement of anti-communism.
But cement is the wrong metaphor. Agreement about an enemy doesn’t hold a coalition together. What holds a coalition together is agreement about the remedy. Anti-communism worked for thirty years because containment was a remedy both wings could live with: traditionalists got a moral crusade against an atheist empire, libertarians got the standing argument against central planning, and the policy of deter-and-outlast never required either wing to surrender a first principle.
Remember this, because checking these boxes is critical to a political coalition.
Where the remedy diverged, the coalition split immediately, regardless of agreement about the enemy. Watch it happen twice, in opposite directions.
First, against the right flank. The John Birch Society was founded in 1958, and the standard story is that Buckley expelled it over conspiracy theories; Welch had written that Eisenhower was a conscious agent of the communist conspiracy, which isn’t a sustainable position. But look at the trigger for the full expulsion. National Review ran a whole issue against the Society on 19 October 1965, with Buckley, Frank Meyer and James Burnham all writing in it, and what had happened was that the Birchers had turned against the Vietnam War.
They agreed about the enemy. If anything they were more agitated about the enemy than the magazine was. They dissented on the remedy, and as a result they were gone. Note the direction: the first expulsion ran to the right. Whatever this mechanism was, it didn’t exist to manage libertarians alone.
Four years later it ran the other way, and this is the story nobody on the right can tell you anymore.
Labor Day weekend 1969, St. Louis, the ninth annual convention of Young Americans for Freedom. The fight had started two months earlier: the national office had been purging chapters since July, both factions had papered chapters to run up delegate counts, and the traditionalists who controlled the office then stripped most libertarian delegates of their credentials. The convention didn’t spontaneously explode. The expulsion machinery had been running since summer.
None of the twelve scheduled speakers was a libertarian, so the Libertarian Caucus held its own night session, brought in Karl Hess, and drew nearly a quarter of the delegates. Its platform called for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam and active resistance to the draft.
The convention’s own referendum went the other way. YAF delegates advocated full invasion of North Vietnam, expansion of the war into Cambodia and Laos, and flooding the valleys to destroy Viet Cong supply routes.
Same organization. Same hall. Same weekend. Same enemy. One faction wants out of Vietnam; the other wants to flood the valleys. Nobody in that room was arguing about whether the Soviet system was evil.
On the final day, every libertarian candidate and plank was defeated, and during the vote on the draft-resistance plank a man from the anarchist caucus stood on a chair, asserted a right of self-defense against state violence, and set fire to his draft card (rumored to be a fake). Samuel Konkin, who was in the room, says twice that it looked like a photocopy.
The traditionalists sat stunned for ten or fifteen seconds. Then they shouted three words and rushed him.
“Kill the commies!”
A room full of young anti-communists, watching one of their own burn his draft card in protest against the war against communism, called him the communist.
That isn’t a disagreement about facts. It’s a reflex that treats dissent on the remedy as identity with the enemy. Libertarians formed a line to protect the man, there was pushing and swinging, and the convention dissolved in uproar. Afterward, Konkin’s point was simple: the beating did the recruiting.
And it wasn’t a surprise, because Rothbard had published the program two weeks early, in the Libertarian Forum of 15 August 1969, in a piece called “Listen, YAF”:
“Leave the house of your false friends, for they are your enemies.”
The year before, in Ramparts, he had named what he proposed to build instead, and the name proves these people knew exactly what structure they were inside of: “a counter-fusion of old right and new left.”
The libertarians trying to start a new coalition against an unpopular remedy didn’t start in 2026.
The repair that wasn’t
So the libertarians left, and then within about a decade most of them were back, voting for Reagan. Everyone treats that as the happy ending, and it’s what people reach for when they want to reassure you the current fight will sort itself out.
But there never was a full reconcilliation in any meaningful sense.
The Libertarian Caucus in 1969 had two demands that broke the coalition: get out of Vietnam, resist the draft. On 27 January 1973, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced that use of the draft had ended. The Paris Peace Accords were signed the same day.
Both grievances ended on a single Saturday. Nobody won the argument and nobody conceded, because the question stopped being asked. Rollback began a few years later with Reagan.
You can prove nobody changed position by comparing like with like. The Libertarian Party platform in 1980, under Ed Clark, eleven years after St. Louis and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, called for reduced military spending and described the draft as short-term slavery. That is the identical position that got them thrown out in 1969.
More, the alternative had already failed: Rothbard’s counter-fusion with the New Left held its first conference six weeks after St. Louis, and there was never a second one. By March 1970, he was publishing “The New Left, RIP” and by May “Farewell to the Left.” A return driven by the absence of anywhere else to stand is a default, not a reconciliation, but it was also clear the libertarians could not sustain their own coalition.
What really changed was the subject. On 6 June 1978, California passed Proposition 13 by nearly two to one and launched a national tax revolt. Taxes are a question where the two wings prescribe the same remedy. The axis of right-wing politics moved off a question where they prescribed opposite remedies, war and conscription, and onto one where they prescribed the same one. Both wings could sign the same sentence, so both wings were in the same coalition, but they still disagreed on the question of war.
Ed Clark’s own pitch tells you how far the stakes had been lowered. Asked on television to summarize libertarianism, he called it low-tax liberalism, a formulation with no foreign policy in it at all.
In July 1975, Reagan told Reason the sentence that gets quoted at every libertarian-conservative event in America:
“If you analyze it I believe the very heart and soul of conservatism is libertarianism.”
In the same interview he distanced himself from actual libertarians, and when asked whether he believed in the draft, said only in time of war. He accepted the philosophical premise and reserved on the institution, which is precisely the posture that lets a coalition re-form around a remedy without anybody conceding the underlying argument.
Six years later, at the CPAC dinner of 20 March 1981, President Reagan credited Frank Meyer by name with “a vigorous new synthesis of traditional and libertarian thought.” He said synthesis, not fusion. And then: “We don’t have a social agenda, separate, separate economic agenda, and a separate foreign agenda. We have one agenda.”
One agenda. Eleven and a half years after a convention hall dissolved into a brawl over exactly how many agendas there were.
On 4 December 2006, three years into the Iraq war, a vice president of the Cato Institute published an essay arguing that libertarians should start looking leftward, saying conservatism had “forsaken the old fusionist synthesis.” Same seam, same cause. A war, and a disagreement about the remedy that nobody had ever settled, because settling it had never been necessary.
Trump won in 2024 with libertarian support, and lost their support over war in 2026. This is a persistent issue in American politics that has led to leftist control of institutions, tens of millions of illegal immigrants, and federal spending expansion that’s generated $40T in debt.
Where the bend was
Fusionism was a coalition that commissioned a philosophy, seven years in, to explain a staffing decision that was already made. It never worked the other way round. The founding document declares the magazine libertarian on one question and conservative on a different question in consecutive paragraphs and never says why those belong to the same person. The theory that eventually said why was attacked from both flanks within two years, and its author rejected the name it’s known by.
What held it together was never agreement about the enemy. Everybody in St. Louis agreed about the enemy.
So here is the test, and it’s the thing I want you to take out of this chapter.
A coalition does not survive on a shared enemy. It survives on a shared remedy.
The question to ask of any proposed alliance isn’t whether both parties hate the same thing. It’s whether the agreement survives contact with the question of what to do about it. Anti-communism passed that test for thirty years because containment was a remedy both wings could accept. It failed in 1965 against the Birchers, who wanted out of Vietnam, and in 1969 against the libertarians, who wanted out of Vietnam. Same enemy, same war, opposite flanks, same result.
And the hard finding is this coalition has never once resolved the war question. Not in 1965, not in 1969, not in 1973, not in 1980. Not in 2006. Not in 2026. What it has done every single time is wait for the war to end and change the subject to taxes, which may be instructive for the modern right.
Why? Because it works. It worked brilliantly and it produced a presidency. But a disagreement that is never adjudicated doesn’t go away. It waits, and it comes back the next time somebody proposes or starts a war.
So the next time somebody tells you the right used to have a unifying philosophy and has lost it, you'll know it never had one. It had a magazine with a controlling shareholder, a payroll spanning two traditions, and an enemy with ten thousand warheads. The philosophy was a retrofit, and it lost its own argument in print, in public, in 1962. That reads as cynical, but it’s the more useful account, because it tells you what you’d actually have to build.
Meyer meant his title as a defense. The tree is liberty, it grows crooked, and the crookedness is the price of its being alive rather than engineered. But read Meyer’s column and watch what it does: in the same two thousand words that gave American conservatism its one memorable formula, he drew a line and put people on the far side of it for dissenting about a war.
The tree was twisted. He just had the wrong idea about where the bend was.
Which leaves the thing a remedy has to be a remedy for. You can’t prescribe before you have diagnosed, and the diagnosis is the next two chapters: what we are actually up against, first from the left and then from our own flank. I’m going to do it the only way that survives a hostile room, which is by naming documents rather than people, and reading the page.
Then we will build a new coalition proposal. In six chapters, I will describe four planks for the American right, and provide an argument about who signs each one and why. Then, we can debate it publicly and maybe, if we’re diligent, we can stave off communism and right-wing socialism for a while longer.
